Adoption of the General Plan in California: Prelude to a Permanent Constitution by Pach, Donald M. et al.
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 3
Issue 3 Land Use Symposium Article 4
5-15-1976
Adoption of the General Plan in California: Prelude




Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Land Use Planning Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Donald M. Pach, Thomas E. Hookano, and John E. Fischer Adoption of the General Plan in California: Prelude to a Permanent
Constitution, 3 Pepp. L. Rev. 3 (1976)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol3/iss3/4
Adoption of the General Plan in






Comprehensive land use planning is the subject of intensive legis-
lative and judicial concern.' In California, the interest in the com-
prehensive planning process is manifested, in part, by legislation
creating the California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission
(Pub. Res. Code § 2700, et seq.), the California Tahoe Regional Plan-
ning Agency (Gov. Code § 66800, et seq.), the San Francisco Bay
Conservation and Development Commission (Gov. Code § 66600, et
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1. Sullivan and Kressel attribute the renewed interest in the compre-
hensive planning process to three primary factors. First, adverse judicial
reaction to ad hoc decision making at the local level, often thought to be
replete with bias, ignorance and capriciousness; second, concern for the en-
vironment and an effort to prevent its destruction; and third, increasing
seq.), County Airport Land use Commissions (Pub. Util. Code §
21670, et seq.), and legislation mandating the adoption of general
plans (Gov. Code § 65300, et seq.).
It is also manifested in the judicial recognition of the legislative
attempt to alleviate the problem of the "deleterious consequences
of haphazard community growth" and the prevention of "further
random development" and the judicial effort to preserve planning
options.2
While planning legislation continues to proliferate and attempts
to enact statewide and federal land use controls are renewed an-
nually,3 there are those who doubt the necessity for further land
use legislation and dispute the presumption that planning is a pana-
cea for anything, let alone environmental ills. One such critic is
Professor Bernard Siegan, Distinguished Professor of Law at the
University of San Diego Law School. Professor Siegan argues that
public land use planning is doomed to failure in a representative
society because the presumption that public land use planning is
something precise, measurable or quantitative and comparable to
a science is invalid. Siegan argues that land use planning is highly
subjective and adulterated by the political process. He concludes
that control of land use and development through planning is akin
to performing surgery by a team consisting of faith healers, exor-
cists, and surgeons. While the patient may not die instantly, he
may well wish he had.4
Be Siegan's views as they may, planning legislation in California,
and specifically that legislation pertaining to general plans,3 has
evolved to the state advocated by Charles Haar 6 where the relation-
ship between planning and zoning is analogous to that between "a
constitution and legislation in which the former provides legal
parameters for the latter." In California, adoption of a valid gen-
eral plan is a precondition to zoning,7 the establishment of an agri-
state participation in the planning process. Sullivan, "Twenty Years
After-Renewed Significance of the Comprehensive Plan Requirement,"
1975 URBAN LAW ANNUAL 33 (1975).
2. Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 120,
514 P.2d 111, 117, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799, 805 (1973).
3. See, e.g., Jackson Bill, Z'Berg, Udall bills.
4. Siegan, "Controlling Other People's Property Through Covenants,
Zoning, State and Federal Regulation," 5 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 385, 398-401
(1975).
5. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65300, et seq. (West 1966).
6. Haar, "The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution," 20 LAW
AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 353 (1955). See also, Sullivan, supra n.1, at
34.
7. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65860 (West Supp. 1976).
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cultural preserve, and the acceptance of open space easements.8 It
is this state of statutory affairs, and in particular, the requirement
of zoning consistency, which leads some writers to conclude that
local government in California is failing to maintain the distinction
between the long-range flexible plan which Haar addressed in his
landmark article, "In Accordance with a Comprehensive General
Plan,"9 and specific short-range schedules for development. It has
been argued that the resultant effect is the creation of general plans
which approach the detail of an official map.10
In light of the increasing importance of the comprehensive gen-
eral plan in California and its immense influence on land use regu-
lation, it is the purpose of this paper to examine three subject areas
related to the adoption of the general plan. They are:
. 1. Effects of the consistency requirement in Government Code
Section 65860;
2. The right to notice prior to adoption; and
3. The use of interim land use controls pending the adoption of
the general plan.
THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION
California's general plan had its genesis in the early 1900's. In
1915, legislation was enacted which allowed cities to establish city
planning commissions." Once established, these commissions, at
the city counsel's request, were directed to draft a map of the city
showing, inter alia, street and highway locations, proposed location
and relocation for public buildings, parks and the like and proposed
widening of streets and highways. 12 In 1927, the Legislature pro-
vided that counties could also establish planning commissions.'3
These commissions were to devise a plan with contents similar to
that set forth in the 1915 legislation. 14
8. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 51050, 51056(a), and 51230 (West Supp. 1976).
9. Haar, "In Accordance With A Comprehensive General Plan," 68
HARV. L. REV. 1154 (1955).
10. Comment, "Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura: How
General Is The General Plan?" 26 HAST. L.J. 614 (1974).
11. Cal. Stats. 1915, c. 428, p. 708 et seq.
12. Id.
13. Cal. Stats. 1927, c. 874, p. 1899 et seq.
14. Id.
In 1929, the scheme was revised so that cities were allowed to
establish planning commissions but counties were required to estab-
lish them.15 If the entity had a planning commission, the commis-
sion was to develop a plan which contained the following manda-
tory elements: traffic street plan, districting plan, transportation
plan, transit plan, parks and recreation plan and a group building
plan.16 A radical change came in 1947 when the Legislature pro-
vided that "every city and every county shall adopt and establish
as herein provided a master plan ... ."-17 Up till then, counties
were the only entities required to adopt a general plan. The 1947
legislation provided for numerous elements; however all were ap-
parently permissive.'
In 1951, the Legislature seemingly took a step backward by pro-
viding that general plans were required only where the entity had
a planning commission (and only counties were required to have
them). 19 As with the 1947 legislation, while numerous elements
were described, none were made mandatory.20 A 1953 amendment
to the general plan statutes made no changes insofar as which enti-
ties were required to have plans and the permissive nature of all
listed elements.21  This permissive nature was changed in 1955
when legislation was passed requiring that plans contain a land use
element, a circulation element, and an element articulating stand-
ards for population density and building intensity.22 Finally, in
1965, both cities and counties were required to establish some form
of planning agency whose job was to prepare a general plan. The
number of mandatory elements had been pared back to two: land
use and circulation. 23
Although the mandatory elements of the general plan have varied
throughout the years,24 in all cases the scope of the plan appears
to have been broad. In addition to whatever maps were necessary,
the plan was primarily composed of statements of objectives, poli-
cies, and principles. 25 Thus, the early plan could certainly not be
15. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 838, p. 1805, § 1.
16. Id.
17. Cal. Stats. 1947, c. 807, p. 1909, 1910, amended Stats. 1947, c. 868, p.
2045.
18. Id.
19. Cal. Stats. 1951, c. 334, p. 675.
20. Id.
21. Cal. Stats. 1953, c. 1355, p. 2913.
22. Cal. Stats. 1955, c. 1644, p. 2967.
23. Cal. Stats. 1965, c. 1880, p. 4334.
24. See text accompanying notes 11-23, supra.
25. Comment, "Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura: How
General Is The General Plan?" 26 HAST. L.J. 614 (1974).
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characterized as a "constitution for all future development; '26
rather, it served as a mere planning study for, at best, guiding fu-
ture development. 2
7
The general plan of today is an extremely comprehensive, legis-
latively adopted document, which dictates zoning by virtue of the
consistency requirement and thereby has tremendous legal implica-
tions.
Current Government Code provisions require that each city and
county develop a general plan.28  The legislative body of each city
and county is required to establish by ordinance a planning
agency. 29 Such agencies are required to carry out the development
and maintenance of general plans.30  The legislative body of the
city or county must approve the plan, amendment to it, or zoning
ordinance before it is to have any legal effect.3 ' The plan is re-
quired to be filed with a regional planning board for the purpose
of coordinating long-term coordinated planning.3 2
The general plan components are set out in Government Code
Sections 65302 and 65303. The mandatory elements include seismic
safety, noise, safety, scenic highways, land use, circulation, housing,
conservation, and open space. Eleven additional permissive ele-
ments are set forth in the code, including a recreation element, ex-
pansion of the circulation element to include recommendations re-
lated to the improvement of traffic and transportation circulation,
a public services and facilities element, and a housing element.8 8
Thus, today's general plan is much more comprehensive than under
the earlier legislation. Statutorily, the general plan is defined as:
"consist[ing] of a statement of development policies and shall in-
26. O'Loane v. O'Rourke, 231 Cal. App. 2d 774, 782, 42 Cal. Rptr. 283
(1965).
27. This was due to the lack of any express requirement that zoning
be consistent with the general plan. However, some argue that there were
former Government Code provisions which could be construed to require
consistency. See, Comment, "Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaven-
tura: How General Is The General Plan?" 26 HAST. L.J. 614, (1974).
28. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65300 (West 1966).
29. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65100 (West Supp. 1976).
30. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65101 (West 1966).
31. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65300, 65357, and 65359 (West 1966).
32. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65067 (West 1966).
33. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65303 (West Supp. 1976).
clude a diagram or diagrams and text setting forth objectives, prin-
ciples, standards, and plan proposals" which includes the mandatory
elements.34
Prior to the evolution of the comprehensive plan requirements,
a California court of appeals characterized the plan as "a constitu-
tion for all future development. '3 5 The court was prophetic in its
pronouncement that the plan affects market values, and that once
adopted it cannot be contemplated that the enacting body will go
contrary to the plan which it adopts. The court further stated that
the plan is the adoption of new policy, that it is permanent and
general in character, and that it is a declaration of public purpose
with reference to the physical form and character the city is to
assume.
8 6
Recently, the 'California Supreme Court also addressed the nature
of the general plan and found its adoption to be "several leagues
short of a firm declaration of an intention to condemn property."37
Despite the consistency requirement, the requirement that plans be
legislatively adopted, and the specificity of the Ventura Avenue
Area General Plan at issue, the California Supreme Court refused
to recognize any legal consequences emanating from the adoption
of a general plan.38
The Supreme Court seemingly accepts the views of Charles Haar,
noted Professor of Law, that property rights are not meant to be
affected by the "mere" promulgation of a plan. Rather, such rights
are affected only by the implementation of a plan.39 In the opinion
of Haar and other planners, planning and zoning should not be
34. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65302 (West 1966). A question which arose in
litigation brought pursuant to Government Code Section 65860, in which the
Pacific Legal Foundation was involved was whether the statutory require-
ment that counties and cities adopt a comprehensive long-term general plan
was satisfied if the general plan lacked one of the required elements set
forth in Government Code Section 65302. It was concluded, based on the
statutory language that the plan "shall" include the mandatory elements,
together with a reading of Section 65860 as to the method of determining
consistency, that a general plan had not been officially adopted since the
plan in issue, among other things, lacked several of the required elements.
The litigation, however, never reached the question of consistency or suffi-
ciency of the general plan and was dismissed on procedural grounds. See
City of San Luis Obispo v. County of San Luis Obispo, San Luis Obispo
County Super. Ct. No. 44172.
35. O'Loane v. O'Rourke, 231 Cal. 2d 774, 782, 42 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1965).
36. Id.
37. Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 119,
514 P.2d 111, 116, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799, 806 (1973).
38. See Comment, supra note 25.
39. Haar, supra note 9, at 1154-1175.
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merged; the plan should serve as a guiding and productive force
by remaining flexible, embodying information, judgment and objec-
tives formulated by experts. 40  Just how. far the general plan in
California has evolved from the characterization given by the Su-
preme Court and the ideal described by Haar will be discussed in
the following section of this presentation.
Perhaps the single most influential part of the 1971 California
land use legislation41 is that which amended Government Code Sec-
tion 65860 to require that county or city zoning ordinances be con-
sistent with the county or city general plans by January 1, 1973.42
Government Code Section 65860(b) permits any resident or prop-
erty owner within a county or city to bring an action in the superior
court to enforce compliance with the consistency requirement. Any
such action must be brought within 90 days of the enactment of
any new zoning ordinance or the amendment of any existing zoning
ordinance.43 Subpart (c) of Section 65860 directs cities and coun-
ties to achieve consistency within a reasonable time after adoption
of or amendment to a general plan.
EFFECTS OF THE CONSISTENCY REQUIREMENT
The consistency requirement brought California into company
with a minority of states whose land use regulations must be prem-
ised on a separately prepared and adopted comprehensive plan.44
The threshold question posed by the consistency requirement is,
what is consistency? There remains today considerable confusion
among local government entities as to what is consistency.45 In
40. Id. at 1176.
41. Cal. Stats. 1971, c. 1446, p. 2858, § 12, amending CAL. GOV'T CODE
65860 (West Supp. 1976).
42. The date was extended to July 1, 1973, by an amendment to CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 65860. See Cal. Stats. 1972, c. 1299.
43. See DiMento, "Looking Back: Consistency In Interpretation Of
And Response To The Consistency Requirement, A. B. 1301," 2 SYMPOSIUM
PEPPERDINE LAW REV. S. 196, S. 212 (1974). DiMento notes that § 65860(b)
has resulted in very little litigation. This may be due in part to a feeling
of futility in light of the power of local governmental entities to amend
their general plans pursuant to § 65361.
44. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 1 at 48-52, for a discussion of the Ore-
gon consistency requirement.
45. See, Note, "Zoning Shall Be Consistent With The General Plan-A
Help or Hindrance To Planning," 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 901 (1973).
a recent survey of local planning and community development
agencies, some of the respondents indicated that the consistency re-
quirement is a major planning issue and that an explanation of
what was actually meant by the term "consistency" is needed.46
Government Code Section 65860 specifiesthat a zoning ordinance
is consistent with the general plan only when two conditions are
satisfied. First, the city or county must have an officially adopted
general plan. Second, the various land uses permitted by existing
zoning must be compatible with the objectives, policies, general land
uses and programs specified in the plan. The statutory definition
seems only to raise further questions. If a city has officially
adopted a "general plan," but does not have all the requisite ele-
ments completed, is it possible to achieve consistency? Second, does
consistency mean that zoning must be identical to the general plan
land use map?
The Attorney General of California at the request of the Director
of the Office of Planning and Research has addressed this subject. 47
With regard to the first question posed, the Attorney General has
concluded that if a city or county had an adopted "general plan"
but the plan did not include all the required elements, an action
could be brought pursuant to Section 65860 (b). This would indicate
that inconsistency exists where all the mandated elements are not
adopted. The Attorney General indicates that the probable result
in such an action would be to have the court retain jurisdiction
and mandate the adoption of the required elements.48
As regards the second question, the need for exact identity be-
tween zoning and the plan, the Attorney General states:
[A] zoning ordinance would not be consistent with a general
plan unless there was a general plan encompassing the required
elements with which to be consistent. The other test of consist-
ency . . . is that the various land uses authorized by the ordi-
nance are compatible with the objectives, policies, general land
uses and program specified in the general plan.
Apparently, the term 'consistent with' is used interchangeably
with 'conformity with.'
[I]t is quite apparent that the 'consistency' or 'conformity' need
not require an exact identity between the zoning ordinance and
the general plan.4 0 (Emphasis added.)
46. CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH, "1974 LOCAL GOVERN-
MENT PLANNING SURVEY," at 18 (March, 1975) (hereinafter "1974 Survey").
See also pages 26-28 for a discussion of the survey findings regarding the
consistency requirement.
47. 58 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 21 (No CV 72/114(a)).
48. Id. at 2.
49. Id. at 6. See also "1974 Survey," supra note 46 at 26-27; CALIFORNIA
[VOL. 3: S63, 1976] Prelude to a Permanent Constitution
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
In sum, while there is certainly need for further clarification of
the consistency requirement, it appears that consistency exists
where there is an officially adopted general plan containing the
mandatory elements and existing zoning conforms to and does not
conflict with the objectives, policies, general land uses and pro-
grams specified in the plan as a whole.50 There is a third question
which arises. That question is whether the Legislature intended
the consistency requirement to effect consistency with outmoded
or antiquated plans. Such could certainly be the result. In light
of the policy that planning precede zoning, it seems anomalous to
conclude that consistency does exist where zoning complies with
an anticipated plan. Donald Hagman, noted California zoning law
expert, concludes, however, that courts cannot be expected to inval-
idate rezoning when nonconformity to an outmoded general plan
is called to its attention.5 The likely result would be court man-
dated adoption of a revised plan. Such a possibility, however, em-
phasizes the need for further legislative direction.
The United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co. 52 established the standard for review of zon-
ing regulations. It was held that such regulations "must find their
justification in some aspect of the police power asserted for the pub-
lic welfare.' '53 The public welfare concept is, however, extremely
nebulous.5 4
Arguably, the requirement of consistency set forth in the Govern-
ment Code adds an additional standard of review. The validity of
a zoning ordinance can now also be judged by whether it is con-
sistent with the general plan. It would be misleading, however,
to imply that the "consistency" standard is any less complicated
to apply than the general welfare standard.
As previously indicated, 5 in order to achieve consistency, the city
or county must have officially adopted a general plan containing
COUNCIL ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, GENERAL PLAN GUIDELINES,
SEPTEMBER, 1973, (Pts. II-11 through 11-13).
50. CAL. Gov. CODE § 65860 (a) (ii) (West Supp. 1976).
51. D. Hagman, CALIFORNIA ZONING PRACTICE, § 2.25, p. 35.
52. Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
53. Id. at 387.
54. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
55. See text accompanying notes 40-49, supra.
all the mandatory elements, and the various land uses authorized
by the ordinance must be compatible with the plan. 6 It is also
clear that there need not be an exact identity between planning
and zoning or a one-to-one relationship. If this were so, determin-
ing consistency would be considerably easier. Rather, the particu-
lar zoning ordinance under review must be consistent with the to-
tality of the policies, land uses, and objectives in the plan.57 Deter-
mining consistency, therefore, is at best a difficult judicial task. It
is also one which the judiciary is reluctant to assume in light of
judicial disinclination to serve as a super board of zoning appeal
and substitute its judgment for that of "expert" planners.
Addition of this new standard of review pursuant to Section 65860
is not likely to give rise to a multitude of litigation.58 The general
plan can be amended to provide the basis for the desired zoning.
In fact, several jurisdictions, without the threat of litigation, have
used such means to achieve consistency. In the 1974 Local Govern-
ment Planning Survey, approximately 29 percent of those cities and
counties responding indicated that they were amending their gen-
eral plans instead of, or in addition to, their zoning ordinances to
achieve consistency.5 9 This is arguably contrary to statutory intent
that planning precede zoning.
One writer has concluded that in light of the possibility of plan
amendment, citizen suits pursuant to Government Code Section
65860 are futile.60 All indications are that very little litigation has
been prompted by the consistency requirement. A survey of Cali-
fornia counties in 1974 revealed only two such lawsuits. 61
While the consistency requirement has not resulted in an ava-
lanche of new litigation regarding zoning validity, the effects of
consistency lawsuits are potentially significant. This type of law-
suit could theoretically result in two determinations. First,
whether or not the city or county has a validly adopted general
plan. Second, whether the plan and zoning are in conformance.
56. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65860 (a) (West Supp. 1976).
57. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65860 (a) (ii) (West Supp. 1976).
58. It should be noted that § 65860 arguably liberalizes the standing re-
quirement for filing suit in providing that any resident or property owner
within the city or county may sue.
59. 1974 SURVEY, supra note 46.
60. Note, "Zoning Shall Be Consistent With The General Plan-A Help
or Hindrance," 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 901, 906 (1973).
61. DiMento, supra note 43 at S215. Note also a consistency lawsuit
filed by the city of San Luis Obispo contesting consistency of a county zon-
ing to the county general plan. City of San Luis Obispo v. County of San
Luis Obispo, San Luis Obispo County Super. Ct. No. 44172.
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If there is a valid plan, the problem would be to distill the poli-
cies of the plan to facilitate judicial review. In the event the court
finds the plan and ordinance out of consistency, there are two op-
tions for the respondent to follow in achieving consistency. First,
the zoning ordinance could be amended. Second, the plan could
be amended, which is arguably contra to the intent of the general
plan legislation. If the court determines that there is no valid plan
(e.g., an element has not been completed), it could mandate adop-
tion of a valid plan, retain jurisdiction in the matter and then pro-
ceed to determine consistency. Thus, the consistency requirement
can be used to mandate adoption of a plan. The question then
arises as to whether a municipality can continue to zone in the ab-
sence of a plan. In recent litigation against the County of Los An-
geles challenging the County's 1973 General Plan, the superior court
found that the General Plan Open Space Element was invalid be-
cause it was founded upon an inadequate environmental impact re-
port. The court ordered the County, inter alia, to prepare a local
open space plan which was consistent with state declared objectives
and an open space ordinance. The court, however, reinstated the
County's 1970 General Plan, referred to as the Environment Devel-
opment Guide, and pointed out that the respondent County could
use the Guide or adopt an entirely new plan. The problem, thus,
of whether zoning could proceed in the absence of a general plan
was avoided.
While consistency litigation can pose significant problems to local
municipalities, 62 it is questionable whether the threat has actually
motivated implementation of the consistency requirement. The
1974 Local Government Planning Survey indicates that 45 percent
of the cities surveyed and 47 percent of the counties surveyed be-
lieved that their zoning ordinances were inconsistent with their
general plans.63 This situation exists despite the fact that 70 per-
cent of the jurisdictions responding reported no significant prob-
lems in the attempt to implement the zoning consistency require-
ment. 64
62. See text accompanying note 61, supra. Coalition for Los Angeles
County Planning in the Public Interest v. Board of Supervisors of the
County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles Super. Ct. No. 63218. See Judgment
filed July 9, 1975.
63. See 1974 SURVEY, supra note 46 at 27.
64. Id. at 28. In light of this uneven application of the zoning consist-
A major effect of the consistency requirement may be its impact
on market value and the marketability of land. The value of land
may increase or decrease, in light of the consistency requirement,
depending upon its designation under the general plan. A case ex-
ample may be helpful in demonstrating this effect. In American
Homes Development Co. v. County of Sacramento,65 the pleadings
reveal that American Homes purchased land in Sacramento County
which was zoned for agricultural use. Pursuant to a 1962 and 1965
general plan for Sacramento County, this property was designated
for residential and commercial development. In contemplation of
developing the property, American Homes sought and obtained ap-
proval for establishment of an assessment district to finance a
sewer system. In 1973, Sacramento County, in response to state
law consistency requirements, adopted a general plan for the plan-
ning period through 1990 which designated the property owned by
American Homes as "agricultural-urban reserve." (Consistency
was thereby achieved by amending the plan to conform to existing
zoning.) This designation does not allow development unless the
Board of Supervisors approves an amendment to the general plan.
American Homes is now left with agriculturally designated and
zoned property. What recourse is available? A reading of the de-
cision in HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court6 indicates that a landowner
does not have a cause of action for inverse condemnation as a re-
sult of the taking of his land's residential development value. His
recourse would appear to be limited, in practical effect, to petition-
ing the Board of Supervisors for a general plan amendment.
A consistency lawsuit pursuant to Section 65860 of the California
Government Code poses the distinct possibility of a finding of an
inadequate or insufficient general plan. 6 What are the conse-
quences of such a finding? Hagman points out that "virtually
every federal loan or grant-in-aid program affecting the physical
development of a locality requires land use planning by the recipi-
ent of federal help.""8 For example, Hagman points out that fed-
eral funds are available for the preparation of an "urban renewal
ency requirement, the Office Of Planning and Research recommends that
negative sanctions be imposed to insure equal compliance by all jurisdic-
tions.
65. Sacramento Super. Ct. No. 249133. Lest this be viewed as an iso-
lated case, the reader's attention is directed to Ernest Webber and Robert
Waller v. City of Sacramento, et al., Sacramento Super. Ct. No. 249487.
66. 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975). Petition for
Cert. filed with United States Supreme Court on February 10, 1976.
67. See text accompanying notes 61-64.
68. HAGMAN, supra, note 51 at §§ 2.1-2.7.
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plan" conforming to the general plan of the locality as a whole and
"workable program" requirements.6 9
The consequences under state law of the failure to have a general
plan are numerous. As pointed out supra,70 the adoption of a gen-
eral plan is a precondition to the establishment of an agricultural
preserve and the acceptance of open space easements. Further-
more, redevelopment under state law is not possible without a gen-
eral plan,7 1 nor may fees be collected or the dedication of land for
parks as a condition to the approval of a final subdivision map or
parcel map be required unless the community has a general plan
containing a recreational element.
72
The effects, therefore, of not having a general plan can conceiv-
ably range from a loss of funding for community redevelopment
projects to the inability to exact fees or the dedication of land for
subdivision map approval. However, where a plan is deemed to
exist a finding of inconsistency may result in the suspension of a
particular zoning ordinance until consistency is achieved with the
resultant inability to proceed with prior planned development proj-
ects. In both instances the effects can pose particular hardships
on both municipalities and property owners alike.
NOTICE AND THE ADOPTION OF THE PLAN
The general plan, reflecting a community's decision on its future
development, should be shaped not only by technical studies, but
also by citizen input during the planning process. The quantity
and quality of citizen input is dependent on notice of the general
plan hearings being given to the local citizenry. The time and
manner of giving notice are both significant factors in the resulting
input.
There are two possible sources from which requirements for a
noticed public hearing might issue. The first source is the federal
or state constitution. The notion of procedural due process is inher-
ent in those documents and case law must be examined to determine
what requirements, if any, it imposes. Recently, the California Su-
69. Id. at § 2.2.
70. See text accompanying notes 7-8, supra.
71. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 33302 (West 1973).
72. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66477(d), 66479(a) (West Supp. 1976).
preme Court addressed the issue of due process requirements in
a related area.73 San Diego Bldg. Contractors Assn. v. City Coun-
cil, involved an attack on a zoning ordinance which was adopted
by initiative. The plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that the city's ini-
tiative procedure did not provide for a noticed hearing and that
due process precluded enactment of a zoning ordinance without af-
fording a noticed hearing. The California Supreme Court indicated
that the plaintiffs' due process argument ignored a fundamental
concept of constitutional law. "Due process requires 'notice and
hearing' only in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory settings and not with
respect to adoption of general legislation. '74 The court indicated
that this concept had been articulated nearly sixty years before
by the United States Supreme Court.75 The San Diego decision
applies with equal force to the adoption of general plans since it
is well established in California that such activity is a legislative
act.7 6 Thus, in California, there is no constitutional mandate for
prior notice and hearing before enactment of a general plan.
The second possible source requiring a noticed hearing before
adopting a general plan is state law. California has set forth statu-
tory notice requirements for adoption of a general plan in Govern-
ment Code Sections 65351 and 65355. Neither of these sections,
which require a noticed public hearing, are applicable to charter
cities except to the extent they are adopted by charter or ordi-
nance.
77
Section 65351 provides that where a city or county has a planning
commission, the planning commission "shall hold at least one public
hearing before approving a general plan or any part or element
thereof." This hearing must be preceded by notice given at least
ten calendar days before the hearing. The notice is to be published
at least once in a newspaper of general circulation published and
circulated within the city or county. If there is no newspaper
73. San Diego Bldg Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205,
529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974).
74. Id. at 211. For an example of a quasi-judicial proceeding see Scott
v. City of Indian Wells, 6 Cal. 3d 541 492 P.2d 1137, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972).
However, it should be noted that not all courts agree with the California
Supreme Court's distinction between legislative and ajudicatory actions in
respect to zoning, see Fasano v. Board of County Commissioner's of Wash-
ington County, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
75. BiMetallic Invest. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441
(1915).
76. O'Loane v. O'Rourke, 231 Cal. App. 2d 744, 42 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1965);
Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 514 P.2d 111,
109 Cal. Rptr. (1973).
77. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65700 (West Supp. 1976).
[VOL. 3: S63, 1976J Prelude to a Permanent Constitution
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
which satisfies the above criteria, the notice must be posted in at
least three public places in the city or county. Finally, the planning
commission may give notice of the hearing in any other manner
it deems necessary or desirable.
Section 65355 requires that before adoption of a general plan or
any part or element thereof, the city or county legislative body
must hold at least one public hearing. The time and manner for
giving notice of the public hearing are the same as that set forth
for hearings before city and county planning commissions.78
Although failure to provide a noticed hearing for adoption or
amendment of a general plan raises no constitutional defect,79 if
this failure contravenes the statutory requirements it may invali-
date the adoption or amendment. Government Code Sections 65351
and 65355, which dictate the manner of giving notice, are phrased
in terms of "shall." While use of the word "shall" does not always
signify a mandatory statute,8 0 there is persuasive reason to believe
that it is used in the mandatory sense in Sections 65351 and 65355.
Government 'Code Section 14 indicates that use of the word "shall"
makes the statute mandatory. In addition, consideration of the pro-
visions regarding enactment of zoning ordinances bolsters the argu-
ment that these sections are mandatory and noncompliance will
void the adoption of a general plan. Many of the statutes dealing
with enactment of zoning ordinances are phrased in terms of
"shall."''s Failure to comply with the statutes resulted in courts
declaring many zoning ordinances invalid.8 2 In fact, the frequent
invalidation of zoning ordinances caused the California Legislature
to adopt a validating statute in 1965.83 While the Legislature could
enact a validating statute with respect to adoption of general plans,
the fact that it has not done so is significant. The legislative intent,
for the time being, seems to be that the statutory notice require-
ments for adoption of a general plan must be complied with. In
view of the increased significance of general plans and the Legisla-
78. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65351 (West 1966).
79. See accompanying text, supra notes 74-76.
80. People v. Municipal Court, 145 Cal. App. 2d 767, 303 P.2d 375 (1956).
81. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65852-57 (West Supp. 1976).
82. See, Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134, 277 P. 308 (1929);
Hein v. City of Daly City, 165 Cal. App. 2d 401, 332 P.2d 120 (1958); Wil-
liams v. City of San Bruno, 217 Cal. App. 2d 480, 31 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1963).
83. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65801 (West 1966).
ture's expressed intent to involve the public in the formulation of
general plans,14 these requirements do not seem to be unreasonable.
From a public policy standpoint, a more pressing issue is whether
the notice provisions should be strengthened. There can be no
doubt that the general plan has become the most important land
use instrument in California.85 Indeed, the consistency require-
ment of Government Code Section 65860 means that a general plan
casts the future pattern of land use for cities and counties. As such,
there will be very few local government decisions affecting use of
land which can be made without reference to the general plan. In
view of the direct and binding effect which a general plan has on
the use of property, sound public policy would seem to argue for
earlier involvement of the public in the planning process and a con-
comitant upgrading in the type of notice given regarding the formu-
lation and adoption of a general plan. One step toward implemen-
tation of this policy would be to give notice to owners of property
both within the general plan area being considered and extending
300 feeet outward.
Unfortunately, the likelihood that the notice provisions will be
strengthened is minimal. The foremost obstacle may be the cost
involved in printing and mailing the notices. In addition, there
seems to be a trend toward lessening the requirements for notice.
This trend is evidenced by the recent decision in San Diego Bldg.
Contractors Assn. v. City Council, supra, and the Legislature's
weakening of certain notice requirements with respect to zoning. 86
USE OF INTERIM ZONING PENDING ADOPTION
OF GENERAL PLAN
Although planning may not be a panacea for environmental ills,
it does serve some useful purpose. It deserves protection, therefore,
from obstructionist influences.
One potential problem arising from advance notice of formulation
of or change in a general plan is the rush to establish vested rights
to certain uses which may turn out to be in conflict with the land
use scheme of the new general plan. This problem has occurred
frequently where, there has been notice of a proposed zoning
change.8 7 In the realm of zoning, the device of interim zoning is
84. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65304 (West 1966).
85. See text accompanying notes 28-31, supra.
86. See, e.g., CAL. GoV'T CODE § 65854.5.
87. See, Freilich, Interim Development Controls: Essential Tools for
Implementing Flexible Planning and Zoning, 49 J. URBAN L. 65, 77-79
(1971).
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being utilized with increasing frequency to combat the rush to es-
tablish vested uses in conjunction with proposed zoning changes.
Essentially, the land which is the subject of the zoning study is
placed under interim zoning which allows certain uses while prohib-
iting other uses which may be inconsistent with the proposed rezon-
ing.88 In addition to preventing establishment of nonconforming
uses, interim zoning, by "freezing" the current land uses, serves two
other related functions. The process of study, formulation, recom-
mendation, and adoption of the zoning is protected.8 9 The freeze
provides ample time within which to make the necessary studies
and policy decisions required for proper utilization of land. In addi-
tion, public debate and input can be encouraged and assimilated
without worrying about time constraints."
'California has long upheld the validity of interim zoning. In
Miller v. Board of Public Works,91 the California Supreme Court
upheld the validity of an emergency ordinance enacted as a prelude
to a comprehensive zoning plan for Los Angeles. The court found
that the city had the power to enact this type of zoning pursuant
to the California Constitution and the state zoning enabling act.92
In support of its decision, the court stated:
[21] It is a matter of common knowledge that a zoning plan
of the extent contemplated in the instant case cannot be made in
a day. Therefore, we take judicial notice of the fact that it will
take much time to work out the details of such a plan and that
obviously it would be destructive of the plan if, during the period
of its incubation, parties seeking to evade the operation thereof
should be permitted to enter upon a course of construction which
might progress so far as to defeat in whole or in part the ultimate
execution of the plan.93
In 1953, the Legislature codified the Miller case law with the
adoption of Government Code Section 65806.94 This section pro-
vided that if the planning commission or department, in good faith,
was conducting or intended within a reasonable time to conduct
88. See, Freilich, Development Timing, Moratoria and Controlling
Growth, INSTITUTION EMINENT DOMAIN, 147, 152 (1971).
89. Id. at 77-82.
90. Id. at 77-82.
91. 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925).
92. Id. at 482-83 (1925).
93. Id. at 496 (1925).
94. Stats. 1953, C.1355 § 3.
studies for the purpose of recommending to the legislative body the
adoption or amendment of a zoning ordinance or in the event of
annexation of new territory to the city, the legislative body could,
to protect the public safety, health, and welfare, adopt a temporary
interim zoning ordinance prohibiting such uses as may be in conflict
with the proposed zoning ordinance. It should be noted that the
ordinance did not require a noticed hearing prior to adoption of
the interim ordinance nor did it limit the duration of the interim
ordinance.9 5 Although the courts would probably have tested the
validity of the interim ordinance by determining if its duration was
reasonable in relation to the scope of the proposed zoning, the Legis-
lature amended this section to establish an absolute limit on the
duration of an interim ordinance.90 This amendment extensively
revised Section 65806 by placing several restrictions on the adoption
of interim ordinances. The amended statute now required that an
interim ordinance could be enacted for only one year and only by
a two-thirds vote of the legislative body.9 7 The ordinance could
be extended for two additional one-year periods upon a four-fifths
vote of the legislative body taken at a noticed public hearing.98 Fi-
nally, the amended section provided that when a temporary zoning
ordinance was adopted, every subsequent ordinance adopted pursu-
ant to that section which covered all or any part of the same prop-
erty would terminate one year after the date of adoption of the
first such ordinance.
In 1965, Section 65806 was repealed and replaced by Section
65858.19 Section 65858 restated the provisions of former Section
65806 with three major changes. The duration of an interim ordi-
nance enacted without a noticed hearing was limited to four
months. The number of extensions was limited to one eight-month
extension and a subsequent one-year extension, both as a result of
noticed public hearings. Alternatively, an interim ordinance may
be enacted after a noticed hearing for an initial one-year period,
with a one-year extension.
Even a casual reading of Section 65858 indicates that it limits
use of interim zoning ordinances to situations where the planning
95. Metro Realty v. County of El Dorado, 222 Cal. App. 2d 508, 518, 35
Cal. Rptr. 480 (1963).
96. Cal. Stats. 1961, c. 1871, § 1 (repealed 1965).
97. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65806 (as amended by Stats. 1961, c. 1871, § 1
(repealed 1965).
98. See, e.g., Mang v. County of Santa Barbara, 182 Cal. App. 2d 93, 5
Cal. Rptr. 724 (1960); Anderson v. City Council, 229 Cal. App. 2d 79, 40
Cal. Rptr. 41 (1964).
99. Cal. Stats. 1965, c. 1880, § 6.
[VOL. 3: S63, 1976] Prelude to a Permanent Constitution
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
commission or department is or intends to study a proposed zoning
ordinance. The question remains whether interim zoning can be
used in conjunction with general plan formulation and adoption.
Charter cities, which are exempted from application of most of the
planning and zoning statutes, 10 0 can look to Article XI, Section VII
of the California Constitution for power to utilize interim zoning
in conjunction with adoption of a general plan.' 0 ' The fact that
a charter city has not provided in its charter or city ordinances
that it may interim zone in conjunction with adoption of a general
plan is of no consequence. The charter is viewed as a limitation
on a city's power so that as long as the charter contains a provision
that the city can make and enforce all ordinances and regulations
in respect to municipal affairs, it has the power to interim zone.10 2
The zoning powers of counties and general law cities are circum-
scribed by the statutory scheme in Government Code Sections
65800, et seq. As noted, these sections limit interim zoning to in-
stances where proposed zoning is being studied.' 03 Yet, the policy
advanced in favor of interim zoning in conjunction with a proposed
zoning, 0 4 the rationale of the Miller court,' 0 5 and the probable leg-
islative intent behind Section 65858 all support the application of
interim zoning to formulation and adoption of general plans. Plan-
ning, even more than zoning, requires a considerable amount of
time due to the necessity for studies and the importance of encour-
agement of public input. 0 6 The planning process needs to be pro-
tected during this time from creation of uses which would be incon-
sistent with the proposed plan. Given this identity of purpose and
effect between protection of planning and zoning, it seems arguable
that a court would allow a county or general law city to utilize
interim zoning with general plan adoption if presented with a rea-
sonable argument that such use was within the ambit of Section
65858.
100. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65700, 65803 (West Supp. 1976).
101. City of Redwood v. Moore, 231 Cal. App. 2d 563, 42 Cal. Rptr. 72(1965).
102. Id. See also Fletcher v. Porter, 203 Cal. App. 2d 313, 21 Cal. Rptr.
452 (1962); Simpson v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. 2d 271, 253 P.2d 464(1953); Comment, Strumsky and the Source of California Chartered City
Powers, 6 PAc. L.J. 85 (1975).
103. See text accompanying notes 99-100, supra.
104. See text accompanying notes 87-89, supra.
105. See text accompanying note 92, supra.
106. See, supra note 88.
The consistency requirement of Government Code Section 65860
provides a basis from which to reasonably argue in favor of applica-
tion of Section 65858 to general plans. Section 65860(c) provides,
as already noted, 1'07 that zoning ordinances must be made consistent
with the general plan within a reasonable time. Therefore, it seems
to follow that when a county or general law city is in the process
of developing or amending a general plan, it must also intend to
study, within a reasonable time, a zoning proposal (designed to
achieve consistency with the new or amended general plan). In-
deed, one court seems to have accepted this analysis based on for-
mer Section 65806. In Metro Realty v. County of El Dorado,10 8 the
Court upheld an emergency zoning ordinance, the emergency being
the pendency of a comprehensive water conservation and develop-
ment plan which was to include formulation of zoning to implement
the plan. 0 9 The Court had no problem in finding the use of Section
65806 to be reasonable in application and duration." 0 In view of
the importance of the planning process and the potential that it
may be short-circuited by inconsistent development during its pend-
ency, the above analysis and utilization of Section 65858 seems not
only proper, but called for.
Assuming California courts will find that counties and general
law cities can utilize interim zoning in conjunction with formulation
and adoption of general plans, what avenues are available to chal-
lenge individual interim zoning ordinances? It is not unwarranted
to assume that interim zoning ordinances used in conjunction with
general plans will face the same type of challenges as when used
pending a zoning proposal. These types of challenges can be broken
down into two major groupings: procedural and substantive.
Since counties' and general law cities' zoning powers are gov-
erned by a statutory scheme,' 1' the use of interim zoning with gen-
eral plans will be subject to attack if they do not follow the statu-
tory scheme in Section 65858. However, there should be no reason
to prevent them from taking advantage of the validating provisions
of Section 65801. Interim zoning ordinances of charter cities, which
derive their zoning power from the California Constitution, 1 2
would be subject to attack if they did not follow the procedures,
107. See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
108. 222 Cal. App, 2d 508, 35 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1963).
109. Id. at 513. See also State of California v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.
3d 237, 524 P.2d 1281, 115 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1974).
110. Id. at 518.
111. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65800 et seq. (West. Supp. 1976).
112. See text accompanying notes 100-102, supra.
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if any, set forth in the charter or ordinances of the city. In view
of the decision in San Diego Bldg. Contractors Assn., supra, there
is no reason to believe that a court would find that minor deviations
from the charter or ordinance invalidate an interim zoning ordi-
nance.
Substantive attacks on interim zoning ordinances can be further
divided into several general categories. Initially, interim ordi-
nances will be subject to attack if they are unreasonable in duration
or proscription. Counties and general law cities must limit the du-
ration of interim zoning ordinances to the two-year period set forth
in Section 65858. However, there could be a problem if they at-
tempted to reenact an interim ordinance after an initial interim or-
dinance had run its full cycle. While Section 65858 contains no di-
rect prohibition on such action, it :seems to be contrary to the intent
of the Legislature. This intent is evidenced by that portion of Sec-
tion 65858 which provides:
When any such interim ordinance has been adopted, every sub-
sequent ordinance adopted pursuant to this section, covering the
whole or a part of the same property, shall automatically termi-
nate and be of no further force or effect upon the termination of
the first such ordinance or any extension thereof ....
Apparently, the Legislature's intent in adding this provision was
to prevent a municipality from freezing property, under the guise
of interim zoning, for over two years. The interim zoning ordi-
nances of charter cities may also be found to be unreasonable in
duration should it appear that the city is not proceeding in good
faith toward completion of the general plan process. Finally, re-
gardless of the character of the governmental entity, a complete
prohibition of use is unlikely to be upheld.113
Interim ordinances may also be challenged as discriminatory and
arbitrary. In Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles, the court found that
an interim ordinance which changed plaintiff's land from an R-3
to an R-1 designation was arbitrary and discriminatory." 4  Kis-
singer held that this application of interim zoning, being designed
to reduce the value of plaintiff's property for future acquisition, 115
resulted in inverse condemnation. However, it appears that chal-
113. See Freilich, supra n. 106 at 152.
114. 161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 460, 327 P.2d 10 (1958).
115. Id. at 462.
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lenges to an interim zoning ordinance based upon a taking theory
will, for the most part, be unsuccessful. This conclusion is drawn
from a recent California Supreme Court decision in State of Califor-
nia v. Superior Court (Veta).116 In the Veta case, the court upheld
the interim permit requirement of the California Coastal Zone Con-
servation Act and reaffirmed cases upholding the validity 61 interim
zoning in California stating:
It is true that the Act is not an interim zoning measure since
it does not zone any property but merely requires the Commission
to formulate a coastal zone plan for submission to the Legislature.
Nevertheless, the cases cited above demonstrate that even more
severe restrictions on the use of private property than those pro-
vided by the Act have been supported as a valid exercise of the
police power pending the adoption of a comprehensive zoning ordi-
nance (e.g., moratorium on the issuance of building permits in
Hunter v. Adams (1960) supra, 180 Cal. App. 2d 511). 1 1 7
Finally, interim ordinances may be challenged where they are
utilized for a purpose inconsistent with the intent of Section 65858.
This situation is best illustrated by the case of Silvera v. City of
South Lake Tahoe."l8 The City had a zoning ordinance which set
a 50 foot height limitation in a certain area. One property owner
applied to the City for a variance as to the height limitation. This
variance was denied; however, the City then enacted an "emer-
gency" ordinance pursuant to Section 65858 which allowed buildings
in excess of 50 feet in that area. The court easily found that there
was no emergency as intended by Section 65858 and that the ordi-
nance violated the intent of Section 65858 by permitting rather than
prohibiting a heretofore permitted use pending a proposed zoning
change. 119 This decision should provide judicial guidance for other
courts faced with a misuse of interim zoning.
CONCLUSION
Legislative action should be undertaken to effect greater public
116. 12 Cal. 3d 237, 524 P.2d 1281, 115 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1974); Candlestick
Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation Com., 11 Cal. App. 3d
557, 89 Cal. Rptr 897 (1970).
117. Id. at 255. See also HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508,
542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975). The Supreme Court in HFH was
faced with an allegation that a downzoning of the plaintiff's property, re-
suiting in a $300,000 decline in market value, constituted inverse condemna-
tion. The court held that "a zoning action which merely decreases the
market value of property does not violate the constitutional provisions for-
bidding uncompensated taking or damaging .... ." HFH, Ltd. v. Superior
Court, supra at 518. Thus, even a permanent devaluation of property will
not be found to constitute inverse condemnation.
118. 3 Cal. App. 3d 554, 83 Cal. Rptr. 698 (1970).
119. Id. at 556.
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input in the formulation of the general plan. Such input would
work toward the formulation of land use choices which are based
on a broader consensus. Additionally, measures should 'be under-
taken to prevent a merging of planning and zoning. Zoning is but
one means of implementing the long-range plan and should not
eclipse planning. One such measure may be a reevaluation of the
need for the consistency requirement. The requirement in its pres-
ent form does not appear to be a catalyst to fulfillment of the gen-
eral plan requirements. Secondly, there is a built-in presumption
that planning is legitimate and that the lack of a consistent ration-
ale for advance allocation of land development opportunities creates
a substantial risk that these allocations will be both arbitrary and
inefficient. This is not to say that planning has no utility. It is
to say that the validity of a zoning ordinance should be determined
on the basis of the reasonableness of the local decision making. If
the decision is based on some prior planning that would be evidence
of reasonableness. Elimination of the consistency requirement
would, in effect, make the general plan the document the Supreme
Court found it was in the Selby case, something that is "by its very
nature merely tenatative and subject to change.' '120
120. Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 118,
514 P.2d 111, 116, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799, 804 (1973).
